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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, dba 
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE, 
STUART LEE, DAVID ANDREW PAULY, 
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., and 
KENNETH BLAIR CLEVELAND, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
14535 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT .OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were found guilty by a jury and 
sentenced for distributing pornographic material. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Each appellant was separately charged for dis-
tributing pornographic material in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §'76-10-1204 (Supp. 1975). The case was 
tried before a jury which entered a verdict of guilty 
against each defendant. Each defendant was subsequently 
sentenced by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions 
and judgments rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
contained in appellants' brief with the following 
additions and corrections: 
1. Although appellants did take exception to 
some of the instructions given by the court, they 
failed to do so with regard to Nos. 4, 5 and 6 relating 
to the element of scienter: 
MR. FLORENCE: The Defendants except to the 
instruction which I have numbered seven, which refers 
to the Defendant David Andrew Pauly and the element 
that must be found before he can be convicted and 
particularly except to the provision of that portion 
of paragraph 1 which says that he was the corporation. 
They must find that he was the manager of the 
corporation and knew or should have known that such a 
book was displayed for sale. 
I suggest that does not conform to the law 
and the standard in the later instruction with respect 
to responsibility of parties and the fact that they 
must solicit, request, demand, encourage, intentionally 
aid another to engage in the criminal conduct with 
the same kind of criminal intent. 
The same exception will be taken with respect 
to the instruction on International Amusements for the 
same reason and the same language that the corporation's 
local managing authority knew or should have known. 
Not only do we object to the knew or should have known 
language, but also restricting it to local managing 
authority is not being consistent with the later 
instruction which says that it must be a high managerial 
agent. 
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Instruction No. 11, in my instructions with 
respect to International Amusement and their conduct 
which will constitute an offense. I suggest the court 
is not limited totally to a high managerial agent, 
or as in my requested instruction No. 4, the board of 
directors, both of which comes out of the Utah State 
law and is much more liberal than is permitted by the 
Utah State law. 
The defendants further except to the limitation 
on their requested instruction No. 6 with respect to 
the affirmative defense and excepts particularly to the 
court's additional language making that defense only 
available if the sale was to the person in question 
was intended by the sales person. 
The defendants further except to the portion of 
the instruction which starts, the test is not whether 
it would arouse sexual desires and particularly to that 
last paragraph in that instruction which says that in 
determining the common conscience of the community that 
they are to consider the community including young and 
old men, women and children. 
I suggest that is not the test in considering 
community standards. I suggest by the law it is restricted 
to adults, that there is a different standard entirely 
when referring to children and unreasonably and improperly 
misleads the jury as to what their responsibilities are 
and the standards that they must adopt in considering 
whether or not these materials are offensive to community 
standards. 
That's all. 
(Tr.171-173). 
2. Although appellants claim to have submitted 
six jury instructions to the court, it is unclear from 
the record whether this was ever in fact done. Appellants1 
reference to Page 166 of the transcript indicates only 
their intention to submit the instructions; it does not 
indicate that the court received any: 
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MR. FLORENCE: 
THE CLERK: 
MR. FLORENCE 
THE COURT: Are there other matters of instructions, 
general instructions? 
No. Only the six that I have sub-
mitted, and I would suggest to the court 
that all six of them, other than perhaps 
some minor changes in adjectives and 
verbs are word for word from the Utah 
State statute also six of them. 
I haven't received a copy. 
I will get you one. 
(Tr. 165-166) 
In all fairness to appellants, however, it appears that 
Proposed Instruction No. 5 on page 59 of the record 
(Vol. No. 1) and Proposed Instruction No. 3 on page 
60 of the record (Vol. No. 1) are part of their six 
instructions. Respondents received from the Weber 
County Attorneyfs Office a copy of what they believed 
to be the appellants' six instructions. Respondents 
submits that in none of these six instructions do the 
appellants refer to the element of scienter in the 
These are included as an appendix to this brief 
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court's instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 6 on which they 
now claim error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 4, 5, 6, 8 AND 9 
Appellants' argument under Point I is two-
pronged: (1) that the trial court erred in its 
instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 6 in that the court left 
out instruction for the element of scienter; and 
(2) that in its instructions Nos. 8 and 9f the court 
improperly instructed on the element of scienter. For 
clarity sake, respondents will treat these two arguments 
separately. 
(1) The long-standing rule concerning alleged 
errors in a criminal case was articulated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac. 
28 6 (1915); the court held where there is no exception 
and no assignment of error, the defendants cannot 
claim error on appeal. The reason for this rule is 
to require the prosecution and the defense to assist 
the court so as to avoid error: 
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"The purpose of exceptions is to 
assist the court in giving correct 
instructions. This purpose is best 
served by calling its attention to 
what is wrong and suggesting what 
is right. But the purpose of this 
procedure is not to permit a party 
to take an exception upon one 
ground, and then if he is convicted, 
use a different ground than he dis-
closed to the court to obtain a reversal. 
Accordingly, if the defendant has not 
stated a correct basis for objection 
to an instruction, he cannot wait until 
after he loses, and then complain 
about it for the first time." 
State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 
P.2d 53, 55 (1967) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently re-
affirmed this rule in State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 
(Utah 1976): 
"There is an important purpose 
to be served by the rule requiring 
that objections be made to the 
instructions. It gives an opportunity 
for the court to correct, or to fill in 
any inadequacy in the instructions, 
so that the jury may consider the 
case on a proper basis. In order to 
accomplish that purpose, the rule 
should be adhered to. Accordingly, 
the standard rule is that when a party 
fails to make a proper objection to 
an erroneous instruction, or to 
present to the court a proper request 
to supply any claimed deficiency in 
the instructions, he is thereafter 
precluded from contending error." 
Id. at 192, 193. 
-6-
There is an exception to this rule, however, stated 
in State v. Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 494 P.2d 285 
(1972), an appeal from a rape conviction. In 
Villiard, the defendant claimed error as to certain 
instructions although he had failed to except to 
them. The court said that if "the error is so 
palpable as obviously to reflect prejudiciality 
amounting to a denial of due process or justice" 
failure to except to such error would not prevent 
reversal. Ici. , at 286. 
In the instant case, respondent contends that 
appellants did not object to, nor did they take 
exception to the instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 6 as they 
relate to the scienter element. Respondent also 
contends that appellants did not offer any of their 
own instructions relating to this claimed error which 
would have cured the alleged defect. Included in 
respondents1 statement of facts, supra, is the 
transcript recitation of appellants1 objections to the 
instructions, and no where in that recitation do the 
appellants make such a claim of error. Appellants 
may argue, however, that their six instructions re-
ferred to on page 166 of the transcript would have 
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cured the alleged defect. Unfortunately, however, 
their instructions were not preserved in the record; 
and if the six instructions sent by the Weber County 
Attorney's Office are those submitted by appellants, 
they do not cure the claimed defect in Instructions 
Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Assuming these were appellants' 
instructions, they merely repeat the same error 
now claimed: 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1: "Before you 
can find the defendants or any of them 
guilty you must find that they distributed 
or offered to distribute, exhibited 
or offered to exhibit, pornographic 
material to others." 
There is no reference to the scienter element in 
Proposed Instruction No. 1. 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 relates to 
the definition of "contemporary community 
standards." 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 relates to 
David Andrew Pauly who was referred 
to in Instruction No. 8. 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 relates to 
International Amusements, dba, Adult 
Book and Cinema Store which was referred 
to in Instruction No. 9. 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 relates to 
the definition of "high managerial agent." 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 relates to 
a possible affirmative defense. 
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Therefore, respondents submit that appellants have 
waived their claim of error by failing to take 
exception and by failing to provide curative in-
structions. 
Appellants may claim that even if they did 
waive their claim, the court should preserve it under 
the Villiard exception, supra. Respondent submits 
that this argument is invalid also, for three reasons: 
(A) The purpose of instructions is to give 
the jury a fair understanding of the issues of fact 
to be determined and the applicable law. To this 
end the instructions must be read as a whole and not 
as unrelated messages. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law 
§ 1321(1) provides: 
"Provided they are consistent 
with one another, all the instructions 
given in a case should be read to-
gether and construed as a whole, and 
if, when so construed, they state the 
law fully, clearly and correctly, 
they are sufficient, although a 
particular instruction or part there-
of, standing alone, might be ob-
jectionable. " 
Instructions Nos. 8 and 9 require that the jury find 
those defendants "knew or should have known" that the 
material was pornographic. Instruction No. 10 states: 
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"You are instructed that 
every person acting with the mental 
state for the conduct of this offense 
who directly commits the offense, 
or who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable for such 
conduct*" (Emphasis added). 
And last, Instruction No* 24 informs the jurors 
explicitly that they are to take the instructions 
as a whole: 
"These instructions though 
numbered separately, are to be 
considered and construed as one 
connected whole. Each instruction 
should be read and understood in 
reference to and as a part of the 
entire charge and not as though 
any one sentence or instruction 
separately were intended to state 
the whole law of the case upon 
any particular point. Moreover, the 
order in which the instructions are 
given has no significance as to their 
relative importance." 
(B) Even if this court should find that the trial 
court's instructions were erroneous, this would certainly 
not be prejudicial error. During the trial the 
trial judge attempted to educate the jury so that they 
would be familiar with the charges and be able to 
listen to the evidence with a greater awareness. 
During the voir dire of the jury the judge, in an 
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attempt to explain the principal-agent theory of 
liability, explained their liability in terms of 
their intent; 
"In other words if A employs B 
to commit a crime on behalf of C, 
they would all be liable if they 
all had the same criminal intent 
and that is what they are charging 
here. But you would not be liable 
unless you intended the commission 
of the crime charged." (Tr.87) 
(Emphasis added) 
Again, after the jurors were sworn in the trial judge 
had the clerk read the information (Tr.125) which 
contained the scienter element in the definition 
of the offense. (See Record Vol. 1-13, Record Vol. 
2-16, and Record Vol. 3-10). 
Respondents submit that the jurors in this 
case were educated and sensitized to the scienter 
element by the trial court and their consideration of 
this element can be inferred from a reading of the 
transcript and record in light of the facts and state-
ments contained therein. Alternatively, if this court 
finds error, the education of the jury minimizes any 
prejudicial effect. 
(C) Last, there was, in effect, constructive 
knowledge in this case. In other words, knowledge on 
the part of the appellants was such a foregone con-
clusion that even if there was error in the court's 
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instructions there is no possibility that "the error 
is so palpable as obviously to reflect prejudiciality 
amounting to a denial of due process or justice." 
State v. Villiard, supra,, at 28 6. The jurors could 
easily have inferred the scienter from a hearing 
of all the facts and circumstances: 
1) There was a sign on the door stating 
it was for adults only, and that 
there was a brousing fee of fifty 
cents. (Tr.130) 
2) The magazine rack contained magazines 
showing explicit sex on the covers. 
(Tr.131) 
3) Exhibit 1-P entitled "Explicit Sex" 
Vol. 1, No. 1. 
4) Exhibit 2-P entitled "Hard Act". 
5) Exhibit 3-P entitled "Hard Action" 
Vol. 1, No. 1. 
6) .Exhibit 4-P entitled "Tongue of Lust". 
7) Mr* Pauly had the keys to the movie 
projectors (Tr.149)• 
Therefore, in light of the above three arguments, 
the case at bar does not come under any exception to 
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the rule that if the defendant fails to claim error 
in an instruction he is thereby precluded from 
raising it on appeal. 
Appellants rely on Smith v. People, 361 U.S. 
147, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 80 S.Ct. 215 (1959) to support 
their contention that the trial court's instructions 
were Constitutionally defective. In Smith, the court 
struck down an ordinance which would have imposed 
strict liability for selling obscene books, stating 
that such an ordinance would place too heavy a burden 
on a bookseller. Appellants overlook that the court 
differentiated between striking down a strict liability 
obscentity law, and determining a constitutionally 
adequate mens rea. 
"We need not and most definitely 
do not pass today on what sort of 
mental element is requisite to a 
constitutionally permissible prosecution 
of a bookseller for carrying an 
obscene book in stock; whether honest 
mistake as to whether its contents 
in fact constituted obscenity need 
be an excuse; whether there might 
be circumstances under which the State 
constitutionally might require that 
a bookseller investigate further, or 
might put on him the burden of ex-
plaining why he did not, and what 
such circumstances might be. Doubtless 
any form of criminal obscenity statute 
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applicable to a bookseller will 
induce some tendency to self-
censorship and have some inhibitory 
effect on the dissemination of 
material not obscene, but we consider 
today only one which goes to the 
extent of eliminating all mental 
elements from the crime." IcL at 
219. (Emphasis added) 
(2) The second prong of appellants1 argument 
is that even though instructions Nos. 8 and 9 contained 
the scienter element, the element was improperly 
presented. Appellants claim that although the in-
structions do require that these two defendants (Pauly 
and International Amusements) know or have reason to 
know the materials were offered for sale, "neither 
instruction requires any knowledge of the character or 
content of the material." (Appellants' brief, page 13) 
Since the instructions Nos. 8 and 9 vary only slightly 
and that variation does not have bearing on this 
issue, they will be treated together, under the wording 
of No. 8. 
"Before you can find DAVID ANDREW 
PAULY, defendant, guilty of any of the 
counts in question, you must find all 
the elements of that count proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
COUNT I. 
1. That on or about December 9, 1975, 
there was sold and displayed for 
sale Exhibit IP within Weber County, 
State of Utah; and that he was the 
manager of the corporation and knew or 
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should have known that such a book 
was displayed for sale, and that 
persons were employed for the purpose 
of the sale." (Emphasis added) 
The instruction continues, stating that that book 
must be found to be illegal pornography and defining 
illegal pornography. Respondent submits that the 
language of this instruction is clear, and that the 
knowledge element relates to knowledge that the book 
was pornographic. 
The trial court did not err in its instructions 
Nos. 8 and 9. Should the court find error in instructions 
Nos. 4, 5 and 6, there was no prejudicial error and 
the convictions rendered below should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT THE MATTER WAS TO BE JUDGED BY CONTEMPORARY 
COMMUNITY STANDARDS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12) (Supp. 1975) 
defines "contemporary community standards" as "those 
current standards in the vicinage where an offense 
alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring, 
or will occur." The trial judge gave almost this 
identical definition in his instruction No. 14. 
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"Contemporary community standards 
means those current standards where an 
offense alleged under this action has 
occurred." 
Appellants are alleging that the bounds of the 
community should be defined in terms of a statewide 
community standard. The United States Supreme Court 
in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642, 
94 S.Ct. 2750 (1974), expressly dealt with this 
issue. In Jenkins, the court held that there is no 
constitutional requirement that juries be instructed 
to apply the standards of a statewide community. 
"We agree with the Supreme Court 
of Georgia's implicit ruling that 
the constitution does not require 
that juries be instructed in state 
obscenity cases to apply the 
standards of a hypothetical state-
wide community. Miller approved 
the use of such instructions; it 
did not mandate their use. What 
Miller makes clear is that state 
juries need not be instructed to 
aPPly national standards. We also 
agree with the Supreme Court of 
Georgia's implicit approval of the 
trial court's instructions directing 
jurors to apply 'community standards' 
without specifying what 'community1. 
Miller held that it was constitutionally 
permissible to permit juries to rely 
on the understanding of the community 
from which they came as to contemporary 
community standards, and the States 
have considerable latitude in framing 
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statutes under this element of 
the Miller decision. A state may 
choose to define an obscenity offense 
in terms of 'contemporary community 
standards' as defined in Miller with-
out further specification as was done 
heref or it may choose to define the 
standards in more precise geographic 
terms, as was done by California in 
Miller." Id., at 157. 
See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 41 
L.Ed.2d 590, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (1974). 
The language in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12) 
does not require a state-wide standard nor does it 
even suggest that that would be a preferable standard, 
and in light of the recent United States Supreme 
Court opinions supra, to the contrary, to expect this 
court to read into our statute a statewide community 
standard would constitute impermissible legislating on 
the part of the court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON HOW TO DETERMINE AN "AVERAGE PERSON" IN THE COMMUNITY. 
There are two crimes regarding pornography 
in Utah, one general and one for minors. Appellants 
claim that there is a separate standard for children 
and therefore the trial court erroneously included the 
word "children" in instruction No. 15, his explanation 
at how the jury should determine what is an "average 
person". Respondent contends that the trial court 
used the term "children" only to suggest a formula 
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from which the jury could ascertain whether or not 
the material was pornographic. Instruction No. 15 
states: 
"The test is not whether it would 
arouse sexual desires or sexual impure 
thoughts in those comprising a particular 
segment of the community, the young, 
the immature or the highly prudish or 
would leave another segment, the 
scientific or highly educated or 
the so-called wordly-wise and sophis-
ticated indifferent and unmoved. 
The test in each case is the 
effect of the book, picture or pub-
lication considered as a whole, not 
upon any particular class, but upon 
all those whom it is likely to reach. 
In other words, you determine its 
impact upon the average person in 
the community. The books, pictures 
and circulars must be judged as a 
whole, in their entire context, and 
you are not to consider detached or 
separate portions in reaching a con-
clusion. You judge the circulars, 
pictures and publications which have 
been put in evidence by present-
day standards of the community. You 
may ask yourselves does it offend the 
common conscience of the community 
by present-day standards. 
In this case, members of the jury, 
you and you alone are the exclusive 
judges of what the common conscience 
of the community is, and in deter-
mining that conscience you are to 
consider the community as a whole, 
young and old, educated and uneducated, 
the religious and the irreligious — 
men, women and children." (Record 
Vol. 1-45) (Emphasis added). 
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In computing the "average person" the young and old, 
the educated and uneducated, the religious and 
irreligious, must all be taken into consideration. 
The "average person" conception is statutorily 
derived. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1203(1)(a) says 
that if "the average person" would find the material 
pornographic, then it comes under the statute. 
There is nothing in the statutes to indicate children 
should not be included in that formula, and in fact 
§ 76-10-1203(2) language can be read to include 
children in all cases: 
"In any prosecution dealing with 
an offense relating to pornographic 
material or performances, or dealing 
in harmful material, the question 
whether material or a performance appeals 
to prurient interest in sex shall be 
determined with reference to average 
adults or average minors as the case 
may be.~" (Emphasis added) 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(12) states: 
"•Contemporary community standards1 
means those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged 
under this act has occurred, is 
occurring, or will occur. (Emphasis 
added). 
The trial court instructed the jury accordingly in 
Instruction No. 14 (Record Vol. 1-44)\ 
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"Contemporary community standards 
means those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged 
under this action has occurred." 
(Emphasis added). 
A fair reading of "vicinage" v/ould include the standards 
of all persons in the community, not just adults. 
The trial judge by including children in 
his instruction was merely trying to instruct as 
to the conscience of the average person and he was 
within permissible statutory grounds to do so. He 
committed no error in his instructions and the 
appellants' convictions should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that appellants1 
convictions and judgments rendered in the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Contemporary community standards means those 
current standards in the vicinage where an offense alleged 
under this action has occurred. 
Nudity means the showing of the human male or 
female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less than 
an opaque covering, or the showing of a female breast 
with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof 
below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of 
covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state. 
Sexual conduct means acts of masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's 
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, 
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or 
between members of the same or opposite sex or between 
humans and animals in an act of apparent or actual 
sexual stimulation or gratification. 
Sexual excitement means a condition of human 
male or female genitals when in a state of sexual 
stimulation or arousal, or the sensual experiences of 
humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or 
nudity. 
Sado-masochistic abuse means flagellation or 
torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in 
undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or bizarre 
costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or 
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so 
clothed. 
INSTRUCTION NO .3 
Before yon ca.. • • •. - n * ~ '' .ew 
Jt-ciul ' v ;- ' • - • •}: -. c r i m o H,; c h a r g e d , ^ m »IU;^L » i . .^ u . * - t 
h<=> s . . _ . . ;• -** •<• - ' ' ~ncouraq<^d ^ r 
i n : e n t i o r . - i l l y a i d e d d a y . . • J • - o u u - . d e t e n c ^ : / . 
. s t i L a L e a Ln& c r i m e I u r w h i c h t h e y 
h a v e b e e n c h a r g e d * 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can find the defendant International 
Amusements, dba, Adult Book and Cinema Store guilty of a 
crime as charged, you must find that the conduct of any 
defendant which constitutes the offense with which they 
have been charged was authorized, solicited, requested, 
commanded, undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated 
by the Board of Directors or by a high managerial agent 
acting within the; scope of his employment and in behalf 
of the corporation or association. 
INSTRUCTION I in 3 
in a partnership; ,-Ml>ei or a corporation ^r 
ctsuoc'i ' r rourdLic^ ^- ":"*ocidtion 
who has duties o* -M^IJ . i^puasibiUiy that :^_^  conduct 
reasonably -n *v b*= n^um^ L^ represent the policy oi ui:_ 
corporation oi: assocI.at:i oi 1. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that the defendants or any of them 
distributed pornographic material to a person haying 
scientific, educational, governmental or other similar 
justification for possessing pornographic material, 
you must find the defendants or defendant, as the case 
may be, not guilty. 
